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Summary
This article examines the disjunctures between the universal aspiration 
of human rights norms and the complexity of their interpretation and 
application in diverse and pluralistic contexts. It examines the extent to 
which a deliberative model of democracy can assist in promoting a more 
dialectical relationship between the universal and particular in human rights 
constitutional adjudication. The article further evaluates the potential of 
the mechanism of meaningful engagement employed by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the context of evictions jurisprudence to negotiate 
the tension between the universal normative values and purposes of human 
rights, and the democratic ideal of popular participation in the making of 
decisions which affect people’s daily lives.
1  Introduction
Over centuries national and international struggles have sought 
to protect certain values and interests regarded as fundamental to
* BA LLB (UCT), LLM (Essex), LLD (Wits); sliebenb@sun.ac.za. An earlier version of 
this article was presented at the International Association of Constitutional Law 
(IACL) Conference in Mexico City from 6–10 December 2010. My gratitude goes to 
Khulekani Moyo for research assistance, and to Gustav Muller, Margot Strauss and 
the anonymous referees for helpful comments. This article is based on research 
supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF). Any opinion, findings, 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the author 
and therefore the NRF does not accept any liability in regard thereto.
1
ahrlj-2012-1-text.indd   1 6/21/12   3:08:20 PM
2 (2012) 12 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
human thriving in widely diverse political, economic, social and 
cultural contexts. Values which today lie at the heart of human rights 
law – individual and collective self-determination, human compassion 
and solidarity, human dignity, equality and freedom – have inspired 
great revolutions, social movements and liberation struggles against 
colonialism, apartheid and other forms of domination.1 For all its 
imperfections, its false starts, and the dashed hopes when it fails to 
deliver on its lofty promises, human rights remain a significant discursive 
and mobilising force against systemic forms of marginalisation and 
structural injustice.2
International human rights law, particularly as it developed post-
1945, aspires to universal validity and application. Thus, the great 
founding document of the protection of human rights under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN), the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) (Universal Declaration), proclaims the concepts 
of ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family’, and calls on member states of the UN 
‘to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance’.3 In 
the African context, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter) recognises the universal impulses of fundamental 
human rights ‘that stem from the attributes of human beings’, whilst 
alluding to the need to develop a particular conception of human 
and peoples’ rights informed by the ‘historical tradition and values of 
African civilisation’.4
At national level, a bill of rights incorporating a greater or lesser 
number of the human rights norms recognised under international 
human rights law is a common (although not universal) feature of 
established and new constitutional democracies. Courts are given 
a significant role in interpreting and enforcing all or some of the 
provisions of the relevant bills of rights with varying remedial powers.5 
1 On the evolution of human rights as a political and cultural construct, see L Hunt 
Inventing human rights: A history (2007); S Moyn The last utopia: Human rights in 
history (2010).
2 Young describes ‘structural injustice’ as a situation in which ‘social processes put 
large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation 
of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these 
processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for 
developing and exercising their capacities’. IM Young ‘Responsibility and global 
justice: A social connection model’ (2006) 23 Social Philosophy and Policy 102 114. 
For a recent account of the mobilising potential of human rights against various 
forms of structural injustice in Africa, see LE White & J Perelman (eds) Stones of hope: 
How African activists reclaim human rights to challenge global poverty (2011).
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, General Assembly 
Resolution 217 A (III), UN Doc A/810, Preamble.
4 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1520 UNTS 217, concluded 27 June 
1981; entered into force 21 October 1986, Preamble.
5 See generally R Gargarella et al (eds) Courts and social transformation in new 
democracies: An institutional voice for the poor? (2006). 
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On the African continent, South Africa, along with a number of other 
African states, are examples of this trend in transitional constitutional 
democracies.6
But these international, regional and national claims of human 
rights law to universal normative validity and application does 
not come without a cost. One of these costs is the reduction and 
oversimplification of the complexity of the particular.7 The abstract, 
broadly-formulated normative commitments of human rights are not 
self-evidently equipped to respond well to the shifting, intertwined 
and diverse power relations, socio-economic needs and cultural 
identities encountered in contemporary societies. The result can be 
that these power relations, needs and identities are either ignored 
or receive only a superficial exploration and response. The outcome 
is frequently an entrenchment of the status quo and disillusionment 
with the unfulfilled emancipatory and transformative claims of human 
rights discourse.8 This is what Brown describes as the fundamental 
paradox of rights, namely, ‘the paradox between the universal idiom 
and the local effect of rights’. 9
The article grapples with the question of how can we can make sense 
of the aspiration of human rights law (in its broadest sense) to embody 
a set of universal normative prescripts and the myriad particular 
contexts and realities in which those norms must be interpreted and 
enforced by judicial bodies. Is it possible to identify conceptions of 
rights, understandings of democracy, and strategies of adjudication 
that may be better suited to generating a more creative dialectic 
between the ideals of universal human rights and the particularity and 
determinate character of needs and identities of persons in various 
contexts?
I start by considering how the institutionalisation of human rights 
norms, through their enforcement by judicial and quasi-judicial 
6 For an overview, see S Gloppen et al (eds) Courts and power in Latin America and 
Africa (2010) ch 5.
7 Other critiques of rights expose how the claims of human rights law and practices 
to ideological neutrality obscure how particular interpretations of rights advance 
distinct ideological projects. See IG Shivji The concept of human rights in Africa 
(1989), ch 1 & 2; M Mutua Human rights: A political and cultural critique (2008). 
8 There exists a vast literature traversing critical legal studies, legal anthropology, 
and development studies which engages the critique of rights and exposes and 
engages the tension between universalism and particularism in human rights 
discourse and law. A small sample of this literature includes M Tushnet ‘An 
essay on rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363; PJ Williams ‘Alchemical notes: 
Reconstructing ideals from deconstructed rights’ (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights – 
Civil Liberties Law Review 401; J Kirkemann Boesen & HO Sano ‘The implications 
and value added of a human rights-based approach’ in BA Andreassen & SP Marks 
(eds) Development as a human right: Legal, political and economic dimensions (2010) 
45; AA An-Na’im (ed) Cultural transformation and human rights in Africa (2002); 
M Goodale & S Engle Merry (eds) The practice of human rights: Tracking law between 
the global and the local (2007). 
9 W Brown States of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity (1995).
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bodies, frequently operates to deepen the tension between the 
universalist impulse of human rights norms, and initiatives to develop 
tailored solutions to particular problems through the participation 
of those directly affected. Thereafter I explore the implications of 
situating constitutional adjudication of human rights norms within 
a deliberative model of democracy, and explore its potential to 
bridge the gap between universal and particularism in human 
rights adjudication. The final part of the article considers the recent 
adjudicative strategy of meaningful engagement developed by the 
South African Constitutional Court in the context of eviction disputes. 
I evaluate the potential and limits of meaningful engagement to 
generate transformative responses to the paradox of the ‘universal 
idiom’ and the ‘local effect’ of rights. It is hoped that some of the 
benefits as well as the pitfalls of meaningful engagement identified in 
this article will contribute to current debates within the African context 
on effective judicial mechanisms for enforcing socio-economic rights.
2  The ‘paradox of institutionalisation’
The broader paradox of universality and particularism referred to by 
Brown is compounded by what Baynes refers to as ‘the paradox of 
institutionalisation’.10 Broadly formulated human rights norms have to 
be interpreted and applied by institutions such as domestic courts, UN 
human rights treaty bodies and, within the African context, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court).11 But 
the interpretation and enforcement of indeterminate human rights 
norms create the well-known tension between human rights and 
democracy.
In the context of this article, I focus on the relationship between the 
exercise of judicial power and the concept of participatory democracy, 
rather than the familiar ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ with its 
narrower focus on the relationship of courts to the legislative and 
executive institutions of representative democracy.12 In this context, 
a number of critiques can be levelled against courts assuming an 
10 K Baynes ‘Rights as critique and the critique of rights: Karl Marx, Wendy Brown, 
and the social function of rights’ (2000) 28 Political Theory 451 457.
11 The coming into force of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1998), OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) in 2004 has created renewed impetus for 
the project of developing the normative content and effective enforcement of the 
rights in the African Charter. 
12 On the distinction between direct and representative democracy, see J Cohen & 
C Sabel ‘Directly-deliberative polyarchy’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 313 320-
321.
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overly activist or managerial role in human rights adjudication.13 The 
following four interrelated critiques are particularly relevant to the 
themes addressed in this article.
First, the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies widely charged with 
enforcing human rights norms domestically or internationally risk 
being perceived as ‘paternalistic’ institutions which curtail the 
opportunities of ‘the people’ to determine the fundamental norms by 
which they will govern themselves and their communities.14 Second, 
participatory decision making is arguably more capable of achieving 
just and sustainable solutions to particular problems because the 
participants are more attuned to local needs and identities.15 A 
rejoinder would be that judges are nonetheless suited in human 
rights adjudication to laying down broad normative principles based 
on fundamental human interests or values that should guide decision 
making.16 While this is a valid conception of judicial competencies, the 
practical implications of these broad normative pronouncements in 
a diversity of different circumstances are nonetheless likely to remain 
deeply contested.17
A third critique, emanating particularly from the critical legal studies 
tradition, points out that courts are traditionally unresponsive to the 
more far-reaching political, social and economic reforms required to 
remedy the underlying conditions which generate systemic injustices. 
The tendency towards stability and preservation of the status quo in 
adjudication has a ‘depoliticising’ effect on fundamental contestations 
concerning deeply-entrenched distributions of political and social 
13 On the distinction between strong and weak forms of judicial review and 
managerial versus other forms of judicial role conceptions, see M Tushnet Weak 
courts, strong rights (2008) 18-42; KG Young ‘A typology of economic and social 
rights adjudication: Exploring the catalytic function of judicial review’ (2010) 8 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 385. 
14 See, eg, Habermas’s critique of Dworkin’s conception of the judge as Hercules 
operating within ‘the solitude of monologically conducted theory construction’. 
J Habermas Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law 
and democracy (1998, trans W Rehg) 223-225; See also the analysis of critics of 
judicial review by C Zurn Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial 
review (2007) 4-6 141-161.
15 Cohen & Sabel (n 12 above) 324.
16 See, eg, A Sachs ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The 
Grootboom case’ (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 579 587-589 (locating the 
courts’ institutional capacity to adjudicate socio-economic rights in the capacity 
of judges to pronounce on conditions of life undermining human dignity). 
17 See Dixon’s critique of a strong judicial role in determining the ‘minimum core’ of 
socio-economic rights. R Dixon ‘Creating dialogue about socio-economic rights: 
Strong-form versus weak-form judicial review revisited’ (2007) 5 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 391 401-402 416-417.
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power.18 This can have a delegitimising effect on community struggles 
aimed at radical social change.
Finally, judicial procedures, interpretive methods and doctrinal 
categories are blunt instruments for dealing with particularity 
and difference. Some of the accepted categories of human rights 
law – ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘prohibited grounds of discrimination’, 
‘the poor’ – create and entrench fixed identity patterns which sit 
uncomfortably with fluid and shifting identities and allegiances. This 
makes it notoriously difficult for court-centred human rights law to 
respond effectively to multiple and intersecting forms of disadvantage 
experienced by various groups on grounds such as race, gender and 
class.19
Underlying each of these critiques of adjudication is the 
interrelationship between substantive human rights norms and 
procedural norms of democratic participation. In other words, how 
should the institution of judicial review be conceptualised in a system 
which values democratic participation in resolving social disputes? 
Is it possible to develop adjudicative strategies which can mitigate 
the concerns of judicial paternalism, enhance responsiveness to local 
needs, create space for radical social mobilisation, and better negotiate 
the complexities of difference? Fundamental to this endeavour is the 
model of democracy within which the institution of judicial review of 
fundamental rights is embedded. It is this broader theoretical issue to 
which I turn in the following section before returning to the questions 
posed above in the context of the adjudicative strategy of meaningful 
engagement in socio-economic rights disputes.
3  Rights within a deliberative democratic paradigm
A strongly representative model of democracy creates a strong 
opposition between aggregative decision making20 by elected 
18 See Baynes (n 10 above) 457; D Brand ‘The “politics of need interpretation” and 
the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims in South Africa’ in AJ van der Walt 
(ed) Theories of social and economic justice (2005) 17.
19 For accounts of the difficulties which legal normative frameworks and mechanisms 
encounter in responding to the complexity of intersecting forms of disadvantage, 
see K Crenshaw ‘Demarginalising the intersection between race and sex: A black 
feminist critique of anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist 
politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139; J Conaghan ‘Intersectionality 
and UK equality initiatives’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 317. 
20 Aggregative, representative models are premised on determining majority 
preferences of elected representatives through mechanical methods such as 
counting votes. See, eg, the account by Zurn (n 14 above) 73-76 of the differences 
between aggregative and deliberative models of democracy. According to Cohen 
& Sabel (n 12 above) 321, the essential distinction between representative and 
more direct models of democracy lies, not only in the level of participation, but 
the topic on the agenda: ‘Direct democracy requires decision on substance, 
whereas representative democracy involves choice on legislators who decide on 
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representatives of the people and the enforcement of human 
rights norms by unelected judges. On this conception rights will 
remain constraints on the democratic process.21 Such a conception 
of democracy faces a number of obstacles in attempting to bridge 
the chasm between universalism and particularism in human rights 
adjudication. The aspiration of people to participate in determining 
the content and application of the fundamental norms that govern 
their lives is diluted through the institutions of the judiciary and 
representative institutions such as the legislature, executive and 
administration. In what follows I argue that a deliberative model of 
democracy holds greater promise in reconciling the tension between 
broadly-formulated, universal human rights norms, and the value of 
democratic participation in resolving particular disputes.22
There are three features of deliberative democracy which make it 
particularly suiting to fulfilling this role. First, the deliberative model of 
democracy is, as Benhabib points out, based on a discourse theory of 
ethics which supply the general moral principles from which human 
rights norms may be derived.23 The first principle is described by 
Benhabib as the principle of ‘universal moral respect’ and is derived 
from the fundamental presupposition of discourse ethics which 
considers the participants ‘to be equal and free beings, equally entitled 
to take part in those discourses which determine the norms that are to 
affect their lives’.24 The second principle of discourse ethics described 
by Benhabib is that of ‘egalitarian reciprocity’. This principle vests in 
each individual ‘the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, 
to initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the presuppositions 
of the conversations, and so on’.25 As Benhabib argues, the step to 
substance.’ 
21 There have been numerous attempts to explain and justify the ‘counter-
majoritarian’ dilemma of constitutional review within systems of representative 
democracy. For a review of the major theoretical positions, see Zurn (n 14 above) 
31-67.
22 S Benhabib ‘Towards a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy’ in S Benhabib 
(ed) Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (1996) 
69 explains the key premises and features of a deliberative democratic model 
as follows: ‘According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary 
condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision-
making processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged 
that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of 
collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal 
individuals. The more collective decision-making processes approximate this 
model the more increases the presumption of their legitimacy and rationality.’ 
Zurn (n 14 above) 70 places ‘reasons-responsiveness’ at the core of deliberative 
conceptions of democracy. He goes on to note that ‘deliberative democracy does 
not just stress reasoned civil discussion – it stressed politically relevant and effective 
reasoned discussion.’ 
23 Benhabib (n 22 above) 69.
24 Benhabib (n 22 above) 78.
25 As above.
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deriving a system of basic rights and liberties from the recognition of 
these two moral principles is not very wide:26
Basically it would involve a hypothetical answer to the question, if it is 
plausible for individuals to view one another as beings entitled to universal 
moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, which most general principles of 
basic rights and liberties would such individuals also be likely to accept as 
determining the conditions of their collective existence?
Thus, a system of rights based on respect for human dignity, autonomy 
and equality are intrinsic to the deliberative model of democracy. They 
enable its proper functioning as opposed to being constraints on its 
operation.27
However, the precise content, application and implications of 
these principles and the rights they give rise to are neither self-
evident nor self-executing. They must be worked out through 
processes of democratic deliberation and debate.28 This is consistent 
with the reality of modern constitutional democracies in which the 
content and implications of basic human rights such as freedom of 
speech are constantly subject to public debate and contestation. As 
Benhabib observes, ‘although we cannot change these rights without 
extremely elaborate political and juridical procedures, we are always 
disputing their meaning, their extent, and their jurisdiction’.29 Human 
rights norms are thus fundamental to a deliberative conception of 
democracy whilst allowing ample space for dialogic engagement with 
their concrete entailments in a range of different contexts.30
A common criticism at this juncture is to point to a circularity problem 
in that deliberative democracy presupposes the mutual recognition of 
basic rights by all participants whilst, on the other hand, insisting that 
participants in a political system should play a significant role in giving 
content to such rights through deliberative engagement.31 However, 
theorists of deliberative democracy point out that this is not a vicious 
26 As above. See also Zurn (n 14 above) 229–232; R Alexy ‘Discourse theory and 
human rights’ (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 209-235.
27 See Habermas (n 14 above) 118-131.
28 Thus Benhabib (n 22 above) 79 notes that ‘the precise meaning and entailment 
of the norms of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity are subject to 
discursive validation’. 
29 Benhabib (n 22 above) 79.
30 As Baynes (n 10 above) 463 observes, in Habermas’s discourse theory ‘the system 
of rights is universal, not in the sense that it specifies a pre-given set of natural 
rights, but rather in the sense that it presents a general schema or “unsaturated 
placeholder” that legal subjects must presuppose if they want to regulate their 
living together by positive law. It is thus constitutive of the legal medium, yet 
at the same time, it is not fixed or determinate. The system of rights must be 
developed “in a politically-autonomous manner” by citizens in the context of their 
own particular traditions and history.’ Baynes refers in this context to Habermas (n 
14 above) 125 128-129. 
31 T Roux ‘Democracy’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006) ch 10, 14-15 18. 
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circle. It accurately depicts the reflexive or recursive relationship 
between rights and democracy – both presuppose each other for their 
proper functioning. While the circle exists at a theoretical level, it has 
critical bite in practice. It invites first-order claims for the recognition 
and fulfilment of human rights, as well as second-order claims about 
whether the procedures and institutions through which such first-
order claims are determined allow for full and equal participation by 
all affected.32 In other words, the relationship between democracy 
and human rights need not be a zero-sum game. A general framework 
of rights is essential to ensure processes of fair democratic deliberation 
based on mutual respect. At the same time, there is significant scope for 
the concrete implications of these general rights norms to be worked 
out by the beneficiaries through democratic deliberation in a variety 
of different contexts. The implications of this reciprocal relationship 
between rights and democratic participation for the institution of 
judicial review are explored further below and in part 4.
The second feature that makes deliberative democracy suited to 
mediating between the universal and the particular is that it takes 
seriously value pluralism in contemporary democracy. It emphasises 
the institutional procedures and practices for decisions on matters that 
would be binding on all by requiring parity of participation33 and public 
reasoning34 as a basis for reaching agreements (even if only partial and 
provisional) on the norms that are to govern people’s collective lives. 
Parity of participation requires that the social, economic and political 
barriers which create subordinated groups or classes of people be 
redressed. These groups or classes are denied the social recognition 
or access to the economic resources to participate as equals in the 
diverse array of institutions which wield power over people’s lives in 
society. Whilst the reality of diverse world views and value systems 
are recognised, deliberative democratic theorists do not presume that 
people’s prior value-systems and views are fixed and immutable, but 
rather that they are capable of adjustment (or even transformation) 
through deliberative engagement with other perspectives and world 
32 See Benhabib (n 22 above) 78-79; N Fraser ‘Social justice in the age of identity 
politics: Redistribution, recognition and participation’ in N Fraser & A Honneth 
Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 7 44-45.
33 One of the most sophisticated analyses of the intersecting axes of participatory 
parity – redistribution, recognition and political participation – in contemporary 
capitalist societies is provided by Fraser (n 32 above) 7 229-223; see also N Fraser 
‘Social exclusion, global poverty, and scales of (in)justice: Rethinking law and 
poverty in a globalising world’ (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 452. 
34 According to Cohen, ‘a deliberative conception puts public reasoning at the centre 
of political justification’. He describes the public reasoning that distinguishes 
deliberative democracy as the advancement of reasons in deliberation which 
‘others have reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the 
assumption that those others are reasonable’. See J Cohen ‘Procedure and 
substance in deliberative democracy’ in Benhabib (n 22 above) 95 100.
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views.35 However, its ultimate legitimacy and application does not 
depend on requiring people to change their prior preferences, values 
or world views.36 Feminist theorists, in particular, have contributed to 
a critique of traditional versions of ‘the common good’ in deliberative 
democratic theory which have tended to suppress deep conflicts of 
value and interests. Young has developed a sophisticated account of 
deliberative democracy which explores the possibilities of co-operation 
on fundamental questions of governance across differences:37
A discussion is liable to break down if participants with deep conflicts of 
interest and value pretend they have common interests, because they 
are unable to air their differences. If, on the other hand, they mutually 
acknowledge their differences, and thereby mutually acknowledge that 
co-operation between them requires aiming to make each understand 
the others across those differences, then they are more likely to maintain 
co-operation and occasionally arrive at rough-and-ready provisional 
agreement.
Finally, modern accounts of deliberative democracy are not premised 
on the impractical and even possibly undesirable notion of a single 
deliberative assembly. Rather, these accounts emphasise that 
deliberative democracy should operate at a variety of different levels 
and through a range of institutions. It coexists with the mechanisms for 
citizen participation in the institutions and processes of representative 
democracy. However, deliberative democracy enriches and deepens 
representative democracy by expanding the opportunities for people’s 
active participation in a broad range of decision-making processes. 
It thus represents a more substantive conception of democracy than 
participating in periodic elections and in the formal mechanisms 
created for allowing citizens input in the institutions of representative 
democracy. Through creating multiple sites of dialogue and avenues 
of participation, the aim is to encourage greater participation in the 
public and private institutions which affect various aspects of people’s 
lives.38
Most theorists of deliberative democracy would accord courts an 
important role as deliberative forums. They do more than simply 
resolve disputes between parties on the basis of legal norms, but 
also shape and are shaped by broader political discourses. This 
is particularly evident when they interpret and enforce broadly-
formulated and frequently contested human rights norms. In the 
context of United States constitutional law, Benhabib points out that 
35 Benhabib (n 22 above) 73; IM Young Inclusion and democracy (2000) 24.
36 See Cohen (n 34 above) 100.
37 Young (n 35 above) 44. 
38 See Benhabib (n 22 above) 81-82. Fraser refers to a heterogeneous, dispersed 
network of many publics as well as ‘subaltern counterpublics’. See N Fraser 
‘Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing 
democracy’ in C Calhoun (ed) Habermas and the public sphere (1992) 109 121-
123. 
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rights are never really ‘off the agenda’ of public discussion and debate 
even in the face of authoritative interpretations by the US Supreme 
Court on questions of abortion, free speech and affirmative action. 
The content and implications of these rights remain contested and 
contestable. Rights are ‘constitutive and regulative institutional norms 
of debate in democratic societies that cannot be transformed and 
abrogated by simple majority decisions’. 39 Although constitutional 
rights are generally entrenched and cannot be altered without 
extremely elaborate political and juridical procedures, their meaning, 
scope and application are always being contested and debated. This 
aligns with what was stated above, that human rights norms constitute 
general controlling principles, but their concrete implications in 
various contexts are always subject to debate and frequently struggles 
between contesting social groups.
Within a deliberative model of democracy, courts potentially play a 
valuable role in protecting the vital interests and values which human 
rights norms seek to protect. In addition, they seek to preserve the 
conditions for fair and equitable participation in decision-making 
processes through which human rights are given concrete effect (for 
instance through legislation and policy processes).40 Many of the rights 
in the South African Bill of Rights, ranging from freedom of association, 
freedom of expression, access to information and just administrative 
action, enable and facilitate people’s involvement in a range of 
decision-making processes which define and affect their rights. The 
Bill of Rights thus protects a set of substantive values and interests 
as well as people’s right to participate in fundamental decisions that 
affect these values and interests. In this way, we can make sense of the 
description of the Bill of Rights in section 7(1) of the Constitution as ‘a 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa’, enshrining the rights of all 
people in our country and affirming ‘the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom’. This expresses the interdependence 
between human rights and democratic participation, and reinforces 
Justice Sachs’s insight that ‘the procedural and substantive aspects of 
justice and equity cannot always be separated’.41
At their best, courts can become an institutionalised site for hearing 
marginalised voices and according deliberative attention to their 
human rights claims. Through the public, institutional character of 
litigation, these voices can be amplified and channelled into the formal 
structures of political decision making and policy formulation.42 Ideally, 
the adjudication of human rights norms can facilitate participatory 
parity in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural decision 
39 Benhabib (n 22 above) 79.
40 See generally Zurn (n 14 above).
41 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39 (Port-
Elizabeth Municipality).
42 Zurn (n 14 above) 242.
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making where power is wielded and decisions are made which have a 
profound impact on people’s lives.
However, it is equally possible for courts to develop interpretations 
of rights which are insensitive to the contextual realities and power-
relationships in which various groups experience rights violations. 
Courts may also be insufficiently sensitive to the reasonable diversity 
of ways in which rights can be interpreted and realised in practice 
without undermining their normative purposes and values.43 These 
manifestations of the ‘paradox of institutionalisation’ discussed 
above create an inescapable tension between the substantive and 
procedural dimensions of justice in human rights litigation. Courts 
may either be too weak in developing the substantive normative 
content of rights, deferring instead to democratic decision-making 
processes.44 At the other end of the spectrum, they may be overly 
prescriptive at the rights definition, review or remedial phases of 
human rights litigation, thereby foreclosing appropriate democratic 
participation in rights definition and implementation. Depending on 
the circumstances of particular cases, such participation may be more 
capable of achieving just and sustainable solutions to human rights 
problems and issues. Without broad-based, continual human rights 
dialogue and engagement, human rights are likely to have only a very 
superficial purchase in society and are unlikely to be implemented in 
an effective, sustained manner.45
This tension between substantive and procedural justice in the 
adjudication of human rights norms tracks the tension between 
universalism and particularism in adjudication. An overly weak asser-
tion of the universal values of human rights may result in arbitrary, 
localised decision making over questions of fundamental rights. 
Conversely, too strong an assertion of general universal prescripts 
may result in vague, broad statements of values which are not 
responsive to the unique needs and circumstances of particular cases.
This creates particular challenges for adjudication. Courts must 
endeavour to craft an appropriate response in the context of 
particular cases which does not amount to an abdication of judicial 
43 For a discussion of these tendencies in the context of socio-economic rights 
adjudication, see S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (2010) 39-42.
44 Reliance on the doctrines of separation of powers and deference are common 
judicial strategies for deferring to the institutions of representative democracy. 
See K McLean Constitutional deference, courts and socio-economic rights in South 
Africa (2009); D Brand ‘Judicial deference and democracy in socio-economic rights 
cases in South Africa’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 614.
45 For accounts of how rights emerge from and in turn influence community and 
social processes, see S Mnisi Weeks & A Claassens ‘Tensions between vernacular 
values that prioritise basic needs and state versions of customary law that contradict 
them’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 823; J Perelman & KG Young, with the 
participation of M Ayariga ‘Freeing Mohammed Zakari: Rights as footprints’ in 
White & Perelman (n 2 above) 122.
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responsibility for interpreting rights and articulating their normative 
values and purposes. At the same time, conceiving rights as integral to 
a deliberative democratic paradigm requires that courts strive to foster 
(or at least avoid foreclosing) democratic participation in working 
out the concrete implications of these norms in a variety of different 
circumstances. As Sachs J observes, if adjudication is to respect both 
the substantive and procedural aspects of justice, ‘[t]he managerial 
role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways’.46
The following part of this article considers the potential of the 
adjudicative strategy of ‘meaningful engagement’ deployed by the 
South African Constitutional Court to mediate these tensions in the 
context of its jurisprudence pertaining to the eviction of impoverished 
occupiers from their homes. As will be seen, the Court has made 
use of orders of ‘meaningful engagement’ at both the review and 
remedial stages of evictions cases. The potential and pitfalls of this 
turn to engagement in social rights adjudication will be analysed and 
evaluated.
4  Meaningful engagement
4.1  Constitutional and legislative context
Disputes relating to the eviction of persons from their homes directly 
implicate section 26(3) of the Constitution, which provides:47
No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.
In addition, in terms of sections 26(1) and (2), the state is required to 
take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of the right of 
everyone to have access to adequate housing. This means that all 
state action in relation to an eviction of persons from public or private 
land must conform to the criteria of reasonableness developed in the 
Court’s major socio-economic rights jurisprudence.48
A range of legislation has been enacted to give effect to this right 
in different contexts, including the significant Prevention of Illegal 
46 Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 41 above) para 39.
47 In Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2001 
1 SA 46 para 34 (Grootboom), the Constitutional Court drew attention to the close 
interrelationship between the three subsections of sec 26. 
48 For an analysis of these criteria, see Liebenberg (n 43 above) 146-163. The 
Constitutional Court has confirmed that the duty of relevant organs of state 
(such as local authorities) to ensure the provision of temporary alternative 
accommodation applies even when occupiers are evicted by private parties. See 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC).
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Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). 
This legislation vests in courts a broad discretion based on ‘justice and 
equity’ in considering whether, and under which conditions, unlawful 
occupiers may be evicted from public or private land.49 Early in its 
jurisprudence on PIE, the Constitutional Court held that a key factor in 
determining the fairness of an eviction is whether ‘proper discussions, 
and where appropriate, mediation have been attempted’.50 The Court 
held that in seeking to resolve the conflict between property and 
housing rights in eviction cases, ‘the procedural and substantive aspects 
of justice and equity cannot always be separated’. 51 This signalled an 
affirmation by the Court that the housing rights protected in section 
26 of the Constitution, in addition to conferring substantive benefits, 
entitle unlawful occupiers to participate in the process of finding a 
just solution to what often appears as the intractable conflict between 
their housing rights and the property rights of landowners.52
4.2  Turn to engagement: The Olivia Road case
The participatory dimension of resolving rights conflicts was 
substantially expanded on in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg53 
(Olivia Road). This case concerned an attempted eviction by the City 
of Johannesburg of a number of impoverished residents of so-called 
‘bad buildings’ from the inner city where the circumstances of their 
occupation were deemed to constitute a threat to their health and 
safety in terms of, inter alia, the National Building Regulations and 
Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBRSA). The eviction proceedings were 
part of a broader strategy to evict an estimated 67 000 people from 
235 allegedly unsafe properties in the inner city of Johannesburg 
as part of the Council’s Inner City Regeneration Strategy. After the 
hearing of the application for leave to appeal and argument in the 
matter, the Constitutional Court issued an interim order requiring the 
City and occupiers to:54
engage with each other meaningfully … in an effort to resolve the 
differences and difficulties aired in this application in the light of the 
values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the 
municipality and the rights and duties of the citizens concerned.
49 On the development of evictions law under the influence of sec 26(3), see AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (2006) 410-419; Liebenberg (n 43 above) 268-
311.
50 Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 41 above) para 43. 
51 Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 41 above) para 39.
52 The significance of participation was grounded in respect for the human dignity 
and ‘personal moral agency’ of occupiers. Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 41 above) 
para 41.
53 2008 3 SA 208 (CC).
54 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 5 (interim order para 1). 
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The parties were ordered to report back to the Court on the results 
of the engagement.55 The Court indicated further that account 
would be taken of the contents of the report in the preparation of 
the judgment or in issuing further directions should this become 
necessary.56
The outcome of this meaningful engagement order was a 
comprehensive settlement agreement between the parties. This 
agreement included steps for rendering the buildings safer and more 
habitable, as well as detailed provisions relating to the relocation of 
the occupiers to alternative accommodation in the inner city. The 
latter included the identification of relevant buildings, the nature and 
standard of the accommodation to be provided, and the calculation 
of the rental to be paid.57 The agreement further stipulated that this 
alternative accommodation was being provided pending the provision 
of suitable permanent housing solutions being developed by the City 
‘in consultation’ with the occupiers concerned.58 This settlement 
agreement was endorsed by the Court on 5 November 2007.59
In its subsequent judgment, the Court elaborated on its reasons 
for making the engagement order, and the purposes and nature of 
such engagement. It affirmed the basic principle is that in situations 
where people face homelessness due to an eviction, public authorities 
should generally engage seriously and in good faith with the affected 
occupiers with a view to finding humane and pragmatic solutions to 
their dilemma. The Court derived the legal basis for the requirement 
of meaningful engagement directly from a range of constitutional 
provisions, but particularly from section 26 which, as noted above, 
entrenches the right of access to adequate housing, and imposes the 
obligation on the state to act ‘reasonably’ in realising this right.60 
Whether there has been meaningful engagement is furthermore one 
of the ‘relevant circumstances’ to be taken into account in terms of 
section 26(3) of the Constitution.61
The Court described the objectives of such engagement to include 
ascertaining what the consequences of an eviction might be, whether 
55 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 5 (interim order para 3).
56 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 5 (interim order para 4).
57 Rent was to be calculated at 25% of the occupiers’ income and the occupiers were 
allowed to stay in the property until permanent accommodation became available 
to them.
58 Settlement agreement between City of Johannesburg and the Occupiers of 
51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg dated 
29 October 2007 (copy on file with author). The terms of the engagement order 
are summarised by the Court in Olivia Road (n 53 above) paras 24-26. 
59 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 27.
60 In Grootboom (n 47 above) para 17, the Court held: ‘Every homeless person is in 
need of housing and this means that every step taken in relation to a potentially 
homeless person must also be reasonable if it is to comply with section 26(2).’
61 Grootboom (n 47 above) paras 18 & 22.
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the City could help in alleviating any dire consequences, whether it 
was possible to render the buildings concerned relatively safe and 
conducive to health for an interim period, whether the City had any 
obligations to the occupiers in the prevailing circumstances, and when 
and how the City could or would fulfil these obligations.62
A number of the key features of meaningful engagement in the 
context of an eviction can be distilled from the judgment, including 
serious consideration of the alternative accommodation needs of the 
particular occupiers.63 The Court emphasised that the nature and extent 
of the engagement must depend on the context. Thus ‘the larger the 
number of people potentially to be affected by eviction, the greater 
the need for structured, consistent and careful engagement’ involving 
‘competent sensitive council workers skilled in engagement’.64 In a 
small municipality where the numbers of people affected by evictions 
are much smaller, ad hoc engagement may be appropriate.65 The 
Court went on to observe:66
Engagement has the potential to contribute towards the resolution of 
disputes and to increased understanding and sympathetic care if both sides 
are willing to participate in the process. People about to be evicted may 
be so vulnerable that they may not be able to understand the importance 
of engagement and may refuse to take part in the process. If this happens, 
a municipality cannot walk away without more. It must make reasonable 
efforts to engage and it is only if these efforts fail that a municipality may 
proceed without appropriate engagement. It is precisely to ensure that 
a city is able to engage meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or illiterate 
people that the engagement process should preferably be managed by 
careful and sensitive people on its side.
Meaningful engagement requires that the parties engage with each 
other reasonably and in good faith. Intransigent attitudes or the 
‘making of non-negotiable, unreasonable demands’ undermines the 
deliberative process.67 Proactive solutions must be pursued and civil 
society organisations should facilitate the engagement process in every 
possible way.68 Finally, the engagement process must be characterised 
by transparency as secrecy would be counter-productive to the 
process of engagement.69 In any eviction proceedings, a municipality 
would be required to provide ‘a complete and accurate account of 
62 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 14.
63 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 18.
64 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 19.
65 As above.
66 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 15.
67 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 20.
68 As above.
69 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 21. This gives expression to transparency as a 
relevant criterion in the assessment of reasonable action by the state in realising 
socio-economic rights. See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 
2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 123.
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the process of engagement including at least the reasonable efforts of 
the municipality within that process’.70 Should this record show that 
the municipality had failed to engage with the affected community, 
or had behaved unreasonably during the engagement process, this 
fact would constitute ‘a weighty consideration against the grant of an 
ejectment order’.71
The Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Appeal should not 
have granted the eviction order in the circumstances of the case in the 
absence of meaningful engagement between the parties.72 The Court 
also held that, by failing to affirm the relevance of the availability of 
alternative accommodation in the decision by the City to issue notices 
to vacate, the Supreme Court of Appeal had not fully appreciated the 
interrelationship between section 12(4)(b) of the Act and section 26(2) 
of the Constitution.73 Finally, the Court held that section 12(6) of the 
NBRSA, which imposes criminal liability for a failure to comply with a 
notice to vacate without provision for judicial oversight of the eviction, 
was inconsistent with section 26(3). By way of remedy, the Court read 
appropriate wording into the section to provide for judicial oversight 
of evictions in terms of section 12(4)(b) of the NBRSA.74
The description by the Court of the requirements of ‘meaningful 
engagement’ exhibit many of the key features of a deliberative 
conception of democratic participation described in part 3 above. 
The interim order of meaningful engagement resulted in a settlement 
agreement between the occupiers and the City of Johannesburg which 
substantially met all the occupiers’ concerns regarding the location, 
quality and affordability of the alternative accommodation to be 
provided upon their eviction from the buildings.75 The order facilitated 
a participatory, contextualised solution to the impasse which had 
developed around the City’s concern to avoid habitation of buildings 
which posed a danger to health and safety, and the residents’ interest 
in having access to adequate alternative accommodation in proximity 
to the places where they pursued their livelihoods. As indicated, 
the Court proceeded to deal in its judgment with a number of legal 
issues pertaining to the importance of meaningful engagement 
as a constitutional requirement in eviction disputes as well as the 
constitutionality of the NBRSA.
70 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 21.
71 As above.
72 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 23. 
73 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 45.
74 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 54 (order para 6). 
75 For a detailed account of the engagement process by the skilled public interest 
lawyer representing the occupiers, see S Wilson ‘Planning for inclusion in South 
Africa: The state’s duty to prevent homelessness and the potential of “meaningful 
engagement”’ (2011) 22 Urban Forum 1.
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Nevertheless, it failed to deal with a number of other legal issues 
which are of systemic significance to those who find themselves in a 
similar position to the occupiers in the broader Johannesburg as well 
as the country as a whole. These issues were expressly raised by the 
applicants and elaborated on by the amicus curiae submissions.76 Thus, 
the Court failed to engage the issue whether the issuing of the ‘notice 
to vacate’ notices by the City in terms of section 12(4)(b) of the NBRSA 
constituted administrative action, thereby attracting the hearing or 
public inquiry procedures in terms of the right to just administrative 
action as given effect by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
3 of 2000 (PAJA).77 Similarly, the Court declined to decide whether 
the eviction was subject to the requirements laid down in section 6 
of PIE.78 Perhaps most significantly, the Court declined to deal with 
the systemic question raised by the occupiers regarding whether the 
City had put in place a reasonable plan for the permanent housing of 
the occupiers and the many other poor people resident in the inner 
city.79 It was estimated that approximately 69 000 other residents of 
the Johannesburg inner city were similarly facing eviction and the 
applicants and their legal representatives also sought to represent 
this broader class of persons. The Court stated that it had no reason 
to doubt that the City would also negotiate in good faith with other 
similarly-placed occupants.80 In addition, the Court expressed its 
reservations about acting as the ‘court of first and last instance’ in 
an abstract and generalised evaluation of whether the City’s housing 
plan was reasonable in relation to the entire class of similarly-placed 
occupiers.81 If necessary, particular occupiers could bring a case to the 
High Court making specific allegations concerning the compliance of 
the City with its housing obligations in relation to them.82
In many respects, the Court’s judgment is a welcome affirmation 
of the principle of participatory, deliberative democracy in resolving 
conflicts involving constitutional rights such as housing. A failure 
to engage meaningfully is to be treated by courts as a weighty 
76 The Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) were joint amici curiae in both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court. See their amicus curiae submissions on-line at http://www.
constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/10661.PDF (accessed 15 May 2012).
77 Olivia Road (n 53 above) paras 7, 9 & 39. See G Quinot ‘An administrative law 
perspective on “bad building” evictions in the Johannesburg inner city: City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd’ (2007) 1 ESR Review 25.
78 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 38. A court may grant an order for the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE at the instance of organs of state if it is in the 
public interest to do so (sec 6(1)(b)). The public interest is defined as including 
‘the interest of the health and safety of those occupying the land and the public in 
general’ (sec 6(2)). 
79 Olivia Road (n 53 above) paras 32-36.
80 Olivia Road (n 53 above) paras 34-35.
81 As above.
82 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 35.
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consideration against the grant of an eviction order. Those directly 
affected by decisions impacting on their housing rights are given an 
opportunity to participate in exploring the implications of these rights 
in their particular, localised circumstances. In this way, the Court avoids 
imposing top-down solutions that may not be attuned and responsive 
to local contexts and needs.
However, there is a real danger that meaningful engagement as an 
adjudicatory strategy may descend into an unprincipled, normatively-
empty process of local dispute settlement.83 This would undermine 
the normative underpinnings of deliberative democracy discussed in 
part 3 above.84 It should also be borne in mind that in Olivia Road, 
the Court scrutinised and endorsed the agreement reached pursuant 
to its engagement order. It did so because meaningful engagement 
had been specifically ordered by it upon the conclusion of the parties’ 
argument.85 However, it emphasised that the process of engagement 
should take place before litigation commences unless it is not possible 
or reasonable to do so because of urgency or some other compelling 
reason.86 The implication is that not all engagement processes will 
be subjected to the judicial scrutiny and approval which took place 
in Olivia Road. There is no guarantee that the process or outcome 
of engagement between communities and authorities will respect 
and vindicate relevant constitutional rights. This is a particular 
concern given the power imbalance which exists between deeply 
disadvantaged groups facing homelessness in an eviction situation, 
and local authorities or private landowners. Communities who lack 
the support of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or public 
interest lawyers are particularly vulnerable in this context, and may 
not be in a position to secure the effective protection of their housing 
and other rights in an engagement process. Meaningful engagement 
would thus fail to meet Fraser’s criterion of ‘participatory parity’ for 
just deliberative fora.87
Regulatory measures and the allocation of appropriate resources 
could assist in redressing skewed power relations in the encounter 
between officials and impoverished communities in engagement 
83 These dangers are evident in the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied 
meaningful engagement in the matter of Mamba v Minister of Social Development 
CCT 65/08, Court Order dated 21 August 2008. See B Ray ‘Proceduralisation’s 
triumph and engagement’s promise in socio-economic rights litigation’ (2011) 27 
South African Journal on Human Rights 107 111 122.
84 See nn 24-27 above and accompanying text.
85 Olivia Road (n 53 above) paras 27-30.
86 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 30.
87 See n 33 above and accompanying text.
POSSIBILITIES AND PITFALLS OF ‘MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT’ 19
ahrlj-2012-1-text.indd   19 6/21/12   3:08:21 PM
20 (2012) 12 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
processes.88 However, equally important for ensuring the protection of 
the rights of marginalised communities is the need for a substantively-
reasoned interpretation of the obligations imposed by socio-economic 
rights such as the right of access to adequate housing in section 
26 of the Constitution.89 Judgments which elaborate on the nature 
and implications of housing rights in an eviction context provide 
the constitutional normative framework within which the search for 
particular solutions through meaningful engagement between the 
parties must take place.90 Such a normative framework is essential 
for enabling the parties, the public and the courts (if engagement 
ultimately breaks down) to assess whether the processes and outcomes 
of the engagement are consistent with the Constitution.
Such normative parameter setting is also important for guiding 
human rights-compliant responses and policy setting in other contexts 
where similar problems are faced. It is arguable that the Court in Olivia 
Road missed an important opportunity to sketch normative markers 
for the resolution of a widespread systemic problem facing a large 
group of highly vulnerable people facing eviction from sub-standard 
accommodation in South Africa’s urban areas. Normative guidance is 
essential given the authorities’ preference for requiring evicted city-
dwellers to relocate to townships and informal settlements situated 
at the periphery of towns and cities, thereby reinforcing the deeply-
entrenched legacy of apartheid spatial planning in South Africa. 
It is only through taking both process and substance seriously that 
engagement as an adjudicatory strategy in the context of human 
rights can successfully negotiate the tensions between universalism 
and particularism.
88 See, in this regard, the discussion by Ray of the proposals emerging from a 
Roundtable Discussion on Meaningful Engagement in the Realisation of Socio-
Economic Rights. Ray (n 83 above) 107 116-120; B Hepple ‘Negotiating social 
change in the shadow of the law’ (2012) 139 South African Law Journal 248 256 
(forthcoming). Bishop cautions, in this context, that the institutionalisation of 
engagement processes may serve to undercut more radical forms of participatory 
democracy. M Bishop ‘Vampire or prince? The listening constitution and Merafong 
Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others’ 
(2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 313 361-364. 
89 On the importance of substantive reasoning in the interpretation of rights 
guarantees within a deliberative democracy conception of transformative 
constitutionalism, see Liebenberg (n 43 above) 44-51.
90 Housing rights scholars have emphasised the importance of these substantive 
normative markers in the context of meaningful engagement. See L Chenwi 
‘”Meaningful engagement” in the realisation of socio-economic rights: The South 
African experience’ (2011) 26 South African Public Law 128 152-154; K McLean 
‘Meaningful engagement: One step forward or two back? Some thoughts on Joe 
Slovo’ 223 238-239.
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4.3  Diluting the potential of meaningful engagement: The Joe 
Slovo case
A subsequent case which invoked meaningful engagement as a 
strategy, primarily in a remedial context, is the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisha Homes91 (Joe Slovo I). This case concerned an 
application in terms of PIE by organs of state to evict and relocate a 
large, settled community of approximately 20 000 people from their 
homes in the Joe Slovo Informal Settlement on the outskirts of Cape 
Town in order to facilitate a major housing development, the so-called 
N2 Gateway Project. It was argued that the eviction and relocation 
of the community to ‘temporary resettlement units’ (TRUs) located 
in Delft, some 15 kilometres away from their present homes, was 
required to enable the upgrading and building of formal housing in 
terms of the N2 Gateway Project. A decision was taken that in situ 
upgrading of the Joe Slovo site was not feasible and the community 
should accordingly be relocated to Delft. An initial commitment that 
70 per cent of those relocated would be able to return to low-income 
housing in the upgraded development did not materialise in phase 1 
of the project.92
The trust between communities and organs of state was further 
eroded by the fact that rentals in the development were pitched 
substantially higher than initially envisaged and greater emphasis was 
placed on bonded housing. This rendered the housing opportunities 
inaccessible to the vast majority of the families in the Joe Slovo 
community.93 Moreover, many residents feared that the relocation 
to Delft would destroy their already fragile livelihood and communal 
networks, and that they would lack access to the schools, transport and 
other facilities on which they depended in the Joe Slovo settlement. 
Following resistance by the residents to their eviction and relocation, 
the housing authorities applied for and obtained an eviction order 
from the Western Cape High Court in terms of PIE.94 The residents 
of Joe Slovo appealed to the Constitutional Court and judgment was 
handed down on 10 June 2009.
The Court agreed on the outcome and a common order.95 However, 
five different judgments were delivered by Yacoob J, Moseneke 
91 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). 
92 The other 30% was to be reserved for residents of backyard dwellings in Kwa-
Langa. 
93 The income of the majority of the families in the Joe Slovo settlement was below 
R3 500 per month. See Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) paras 31-34 (per Yacoob J); para 307 
(per O’Regan J); paras 371-376 (per Sachs J).
94 Thubelisha Homes & Others v Various Occupiers & Others Case 13189/07 (C) 
(10 March 2008). 
95 The Court summarised the grounds on which all the justices agreed that the order 
should be made. Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) paras 1-10.
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DCJ,96 Ngcobo J,97 O’Regan J, and Sachs J.98 Each of these judgments 
provided different reasoning in support of the order. The outcome 
was that the eviction order was upheld, but the Court subjected the 
implementation of the order to detailed conditions. Thus, the eviction 
was made conditional on the applicants being relocated to TRUs 
situated in Delft or another appropriate location.99 The Court’s order 
contains detailed specifications regarding the nature and quality of 
the alternative accommodation which the authorities were obliged to 
provide.100 It also obliged the respondents to ensure that 70 per cent 
of the new homes to be built on the site of the Joe Slovo informal 
settlement were allocated to Joe Slovo residents.101 Significantly, 
the order requires an ongoing process of meaningful engagement 
between the residents and respondents concerning various aspects 
of the eviction and relocation process.102 The parties were directed 
to report to Court on the implementation of the order and the 
allocation of permanent housing opportunities to those affected by 
the order.103
However, a major point of concern in this judgment is how quickly 
the Court retreated from the substantive promise of meaningful 
engagement in Olivia Road as a key consideration in determining 
whether an eviction order was justifiable in the particular case. A clearly 
perfunctory, inadequate engagement process regarding the need for 
the community to be evicted (with all the accompanying disruption to 
lives and livelihoods this implied), as opposed to the in situ upgrade 
argued for by the community, was essentially condoned. The flawed 
nature of the engagement between the officials and community is 
described as follows by Sachs J in his judgment:104
There can be no doubt that there were major failures of communication 
on the part of the authorities. The evidence suggests the frequent 
employment of a top-down approach where the purpose of reporting 
back to the community was seen as being to pass on information about 
decisions already taken rather than to involve the residents as partners in 
the process of decision making itself.
96 Sachs J concurred in the judgment by Moseneke DCJ.
97 Langa CJ and Van der Westhuizen J concurred in the judgment of Yacoob J.
98 Moseneke DCJ and Mokgoro J concurred in the judgment of Sachs J.
99 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 7 (Order para 4).
100 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 7 (Order paras 9–10). As Mbazira observes, the detailed 
prescriptions in the Court’s order concerning the nature and standard of alternative 
accommodation to be provided stands in stark contrast to other cases where the 
Court has been unwilling to engage with the substance of what adequate housing 
entails, even at a minimal level. C Mbazira ‘Grootboom: A paradigm of individual 
remedies versus reasonable programmes’ (2011) 26 South African Public Law 60 
79.
101 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 7 (Order para 17).
102 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 7 (Order paras 5 and 11). 
103 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 16.
104 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 378 (per Sachs J, footnotes omitted).
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This top-down form of engagement represents a retreat from the 
structured and reciprocal deliberative process which the Court 
endorsed in Olivia Road.105 The acknowledged inadequacies in the 
engagement process did not vitiate the ultimate decisions taken 
concerning the Joe Slovo community. Essentially, the Court held that 
the greater good which the N2 Gateway project sought to achieve 
along with the need for ‘realism and practicality’106 outweighed the 
defects in the engagement process.
In Olivia Road, the Court appeared to lay down the principle that the 
absence of meaningful engagement should ordinarily be a weighty 
consideration against the grant of an eviction order.107 Meaningful 
engagement, on this interpretation, constitutes a substantive 
normative criterion derived from section 26 of the Constitution. Joe 
Slovo represents a retreat from this principle. Instead of playing the 
role of a normative principle, meaningful engagement is deployed in 
the remedial phases to ensure participation in the nuts and bolts of 
the implementation of the eviction order. In this context, meaningful 
engagement is used in a manner similar to the type of participatory 
structural interdicts described by scholars of public interest litigation 
in the US context.108 As McLean argues, the Court essentially found an 
eviction to be just and equitable even in the absence of meaningful 
engagement, thereby retreating to ‘an even narrower conception of 
reasonableness in section 26(2) of the Constitution’.109 The judgment 
is thus normatively weak,110 but contains strong remedial safeguards 
in respect of the implementation of the eviction order.
On 31 March 2011, after various extensions of the original order 
had been sought and granted, the Court handed down a judgment 
105 Olivia Road (n 53 above) para 19.
106 See Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 117 (per Yacoob J). In a similar vein, O’Regan J 
writes that fair process ‘should not result in unnecessary and prolix requirements 
that may strangle government action’ (para 296).
107 See n 71 above and accompanying text.
108 See CF Sabel & WH Simon ‘Destabilisation rights: How public law litigation 
succeeds’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 1016. The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights has also required participation or dialogue between states and 
communities in implementing its recommendations in certain communications 
relating to socio-economic rights and the right to development. See Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001) para 71; Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan (2009) AHRLR 
153 (ACHPR 2009) para 229; Centre for Minority Rights Development & Others v 
Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009) para 251.
109 McLean (n 90 above) 241.
110 Apart from its own previous jurisprudence in Olivia Road, important normative 
criteria could have been derived, eg, from the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, developed under the auspices 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right 
to an Adequate Standard of Living. See UN Doc A/HRC/4/18, 5 February 2007 
(Annex 1).
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discharging the eviction order it had granted in Joe Slovo I.111 
The engagement reports to the Court by the Minister for Human 
Settlements (the second respondent) and the MEC for Human 
Settlements, Western Cape (the third respondent) eventually indicated 
the feasibility and intention of the respondents to pursue an in situ 
upgrading of Joe Slovo rather than relocation. The Court held that, 
although orders of the Court ought not to be discharged lightly, it 
had a discretion to discharge orders evicting people from their homes 
where the change was necessitated by exceptional circumstances and 
considerations of justice and equity.112 In this particular case, these 
criteria were met as it was common cause that the most likely course 
for the redevelopment of the Joe Slovo settlement area would be in situ 
development.113 Many aspects of the original order could and would 
no longer be complied with, such as the relocation to TRUs, the original 
timetable, and the 70/30 split in the allocation of homes in the final 
development.114 In addition, there had been little or no engagement 
in relation to the relocation process, nor was there likely to be any 
engagement in relation to relocation in future.115 The Court’s original 
order contemplated that the relocation process was to commence 
about two months after the order was made and any agreement 
concerning amendments to the timetable was to be placed before the 
Court less than a month after the date of its order. The supervised 
eviction order did not contemplate the commencement of execution 
over a year and a half after the order was made.116 In effect, there 
had been a fundamental change in circumstances since the original 
order was made, and the original order was no longer necessary or 
implementable. In this regard, the Court pointed out that it would 
not have granted the original eviction order had it ‘not found that the 
relocation could not be said to be unnecessary’. It went on to state:117
Indeed had it not been necessary to relocate the residents for the purpose 
of housing development or any other compelling reason, the application 
[for eviction] would probably have been dismissed.
The irony is inescapable. Had the necessity of evicting 20 000 people 
to a temporary resettlement area a substantial distance from their 
homes been properly explored by the authorities through meaningful 
engagement with the community and their expert advisors, the 
costly and time-consuming litigation might have been avoided. The 
111 Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR 723 (CC) (Joe 
Slovo II).
112 Joe Slovo II (n 111 above) para 28.
113 Joe Slovo II (n 111 above) para 30.
114 As above.
115 As above.
116 Joe Slovo II (n 111 above) para 36.
117 Joe Slovo II (n 111 above) para 29.
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time and energy of all role-players could rather have been invested 
in the actual process of redeveloping and upgrading of Joe Slovo. 
Although meaningful engagement does not, as Ngcobo J noted, 
require the parties ‘to agree on every issue’, it does require ‘good 
faith and reasonableness on both sides and the willingness to listen 
and understand the concerns of the other side’.118 There should be 
a serious and sustained effort to reach mutual accommodations in 
relation to the disputed issues. There are telling indications that the 
engagement that took place prior to the decision to embark on an 
eviction exercise did not conform to the basic principles of structured 
interaction, an exchange of public reason-giving, mutual listening,119 
and a joint exploration of solutions to accommodate the concerns 
of the other.120 As discussed in part 3 above, these represent the key 
features of processes of deliberative decision making.121
The extent to which the Court was prepared to condone the 
defective engagement process in Joe Slovo can also be contrasted with 
its more robust affirmation of what the impact of a lack of meaningful 
engagement on the granting of an eviction order should be in Abahlali 
baseMjondolo Movement SA v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal122 (Abahlali). 
The majority and minority judgment differed only on whether it was 
possible to interpret the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention 
of Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 consistently with section 
26(2) of the Constitution, including the requirement of meaningful 
engagement prior to evictions. The minority judgment of Yacoob J 
held that section 16 of the Act could be read as requiring meaningful 
engagement prior to the institution of eviction proceedings. He 
held:123
If it appears as a result of the process of engagement, for example, that the 
property concerned can be upgraded without the eviction of the unlawful 
118 Joe Slovo I (n 91 above) para 244.
119 On the significance of listening (as opposed to merely ‘hearing’) in participatory 
and deliberative democratic processes, see Bishop (n 88 above) 323.
120 One would ideally have wished to have a more detailed description and analysis of 
the engagement process with the Joe Slovo community regarding the upgrading 
of the settlement, specifically in relation to the decision to relocate the residents as 
opposed to pursuing an in situ upgrade. Nevertheless, some of the abovementioned 
defects in the engagement process can be gleaned from the following paragraphs 
in the judgment: Joe Slovo I (n 91 above): paras 28-34; para 109 (per Yacoob J); 
paras 166-167 (per Moseneke DCJ); paras 245-247 (per Ngcobo J); paras 297-304 
(per O’Regan J); paras 378-384 (per Sachs J). 
121 See Muller’s characterisation of meaningful engagement as a deliberative 
democratic partnership drawing on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation. 
G Muller ‘Conceptualising “meaningful engagement” as deliberative democratic 
partnership’ (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 742 753-756.
122 2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC). This decision was handed down less than a month before 
judgment in Joe Slovo I was handed down.
123 Abahlali (n 122 above) para 69. 
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occupiers, the municipality cannot institute eviction proceedings. This is 
because it would not be acting reasonably in the engagement process.
The majority per Moseneke DCJ held that this reading of section 16 
was not reasonably plausible and that section 16 was unconstitutional 
in that it did not give effect to the constitutional and legislative 
requirements of meaningful engagement and the principle that 
evictions may only be resorted to as a measure of last resort.124
It could be argued that the engagement required on the 
implementation of the eviction order in Joe Slovo I, coupled with 
the detailed specifications concerning the standard of alternative 
accommodation to be provided, contributed to the eventual 
resolution of the dispute between the community and the authorities. 
This argument may hold more than a grain of truth, but it does not 
detract from the criticism of the dilution of meaningful engagement as 
a substantive normative criterion in determining whether an eviction 
is consistent with section 26 of the Constitution and the justice and 
equity requirements of PIE. The structured order handed down by the 
Court may have contributed to a localised solution to the Joe Slovo 
dispute, but at the expense of affirming the normative purposes and 
values underpinning the constitutional protection of housing rights. 
Joe Slovo represents a dilution of meaningful engagement’s potential 
to promote deliberative participation by citizenry in decisions affecting 
their rights within clearly-articulated normative parameters.
4.4  Meaningful engagement: Conceptualising the courts’ role
The mechanism of meaningful engagement developed in cases such 
as Olivia Road, Joe Slovo and Abahlali has the potential to promote 
localised, contextual solutions to human rights conflicts. It can also 
stimulate systemic administrative and political reforms to facilitate 
participation by communities in resolving rights conflicts and 
implementing policies and programmes to give effect to rights.125 
The court’s role within this model is not to develop comprehensive 
specifications of constitutional rights, but rather to prod and stimulate 
communities and public and private institutions to develop tailored 
policies and programmes informed by constitutionally-grounded 
reasons. As described by Cohen and Sabel:126
[T]he responsibility of constitutional courts … is to require that problem 
solvers themselves make policy with express reference to both constitutional 
and relevant policy reasons. You might describe this as a genuine fusion of 
constitutional and democratic ideals: a fusion, inasmuch as the conception 
124 Abahlali (n 122 above) paras 113-115.
125 For a nuanced exploration of the systemic potential of meaningful engagement, 
see B Ray ‘Extending the shadow of the law: Using hybrid mechanisms to develop 
constitutional norms in socio-economic rights cases’ (2009) 3 Utah Law Review 
797.
126 Cohen & Sabel (n 12 above) 335.
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of democratic process includes a requirement that constitutional reasons 
be taken into account, as such. The aim is a form of political deliberation 
in which citizens themselves are to give suitable weight to constitutional 
considerations, and not leave that responsibility to a court.
However, meaningful engagement as a mechanism to facilitate 
constitutionally-informed deliberation remains inadequate without the 
Court exercising its responsibility to articulate what would constitute 
acceptable ‘constitutional reasons’ in the context of the various rights 
in the Bill of Rights. This requires developing the purposes and values 
which the various rights seek to advance together with relevant criteria 
for assessing whether particular policies or practices are consistent 
with these purposes and values. A substantive interpretation of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights is not only essential for the setting of 
the engagement agenda, but it should also provide an evaluative 
framework for assessing the outcomes of the engagement exercise. 
In the end, all participants should have to account for the consistency 
of any provisional agreements emerging from engagement with the 
normative commitments of the Bill of Rights. In this way, the normative 
framework serves as a safeguard against negotiated settlements 
which simply reflect the interests of the more powerful party in the 
engagement process.
In essence, therefore, the courts should not abdicate their role 
to articulate and enforce the normative parameters within which 
engagement processes on socio-economic rights such as housing 
should occur. This indeed represents an affirmation of universal 
standards beyond the particular context. At the same time (as noted 
above) there is broad scope for deliberative participation on precisely 
which legislative or policy measures and institutional responses 
would be consistent with these normative standards.127 This space 
between broadly-formulated human rights standards and their 
particular applications should be used by courts to encourage and, in 
certain contexts, require deliberative engagement between relevant 
stakeholders. At the review stage of human rights enforcement, 
a court could adopt the position that, in the absence of such prior 
engagement, they will be slow to grant relief to the defaulting party. 
This is in effect what the Constitutional Court affirmed in Olivia Road, 
but failed to give effect to in Joe Slovo. At the remedial stage, there 
is much untapped potential in the structural interdict remedy to 
facilitate engagement on the concrete measures required to give effect 
to the human rights goals set by a court at the review stage of a socio-
economic rights case. Through the reporting-back requirements and 
127 In Grootboom (n 47 above) para 41, the Court held, in adopting the reasonableness 
model of review for positive socio-economic rights, that ‘it is necessary to recognise 
that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its 
obligations’. See also art 8(4) to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution A/
RES/63/117 (5 March 2009) (not yet in force).
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the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, a court can exercise control 
over the process and outcome of deliberative engagement between 
the parties to ensure that agreements reached are consonant with 
the normative parameters and goals initially set by the court.128 In so 
doing, adjudication can facilitate deliberative democracy in giving 
effect to human rights norms in particular contexts.
The mechanism of meaningful engagement has thus far been 
deployed by the South African courts primarily in the adjudication of 
eviction disputes.129 As the above analysis of the case law suggests, 
there is still much work to be done by activists, government officials, 
scholars and courts before meaningful engagement begins to play a 
significant role in human rights adjudication in South Africa.
5  Conclusion
In evaluating the contribution of Lefort130 to the challenges of the 
universal and particular in human rights law, Baynes observes as 
follows:131
For Lefort, by contrast, the universal and the particular are not simply 
opposed to one another, nor is democracy defined over against (individual) 
rights. Rather, democracy and rights mutually suppose one another in a 
way that leaves the relation between the universal and the particular open 
to contestation and continuous revision or reformulation.
In this article I have sought to explore how the universal normative 
standards represented by human rights can be rendered more 
responsive to people’s particular needs and unique circumstances. 
I have argued that a deliberative democratic understanding of 
constitutionalism and judicial review offers the most hopeful 
theoretical underpinnings for this enterprise. Finally, I have explored 
a concrete adjudicative strategy adopted by the South African 
Constitutional Court which attempts to prod communities, state 
officials and private landowners to find tailored solutions to the 
myriad complex issues which arise in eviction disputes through 
128 For a more in-depth exploration of the potential of structural interdicts, see 
generally Sabel & Simon (n 108) above; Liebenberg (n 43 above) 424-438.
129 See, however, its appearance in a recent case concerning education rights, 
Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (see 
particularly paras 63-65 and para 76, including the Order of the Constitutional 
Court dated 25 November 2010 replicated at footnote 87 of the judgment). There 
are also unresolved questions regarding the relationship between meaningful 
engagement and procedural fairness in administrative law. See Quinot (n 77 
above); Muller (n 121 above) 745-752. 
130 C Lefort ‘Human rights and the welfare state’ in C Lefort (ed) Democracy and 
political theory (1988) 39; C Lefort ‘Politics and human rights’ in JB Thompson 
(ed) The political forms of modern society: bureaucracy, democracy, totalitarianism 
(1986) 250.
131 Baynes (n 10 above) 460.
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deliberative engagement.132 The Court has generally tended to 
avoid comprehensive, final prescriptions on what the housing rights 
enshrined in section 26 of the Constitution entail. In so doing, it has 
created the space for the stakeholders in evictions disputes to explore 
the implications of these rights in the context of their particular 
circumstances.
As I have sought to demonstrate, however, the pendulum has swung 
too far in the direction of promoting localised settlement negotiations, 
and too far away from developing the normative guidelines 
within which deliberative engagement between the stakeholders 
should occur. A too narrow focus on the particular can result in an 
undermining of the potential of human rights adjudication to pose 
an ethical challenge to systemic forms of social injustice. Despite 
these shortcomings, there is much to be gained through continuing 
experimentation with mechanisms to promote dialogic engagement 
on the concrete entailments of human rights in various contexts.
The constitutional adjudication of human rights in South Africa 
will have achieved much if it succeeds in deepening both deliberative 
democracy and the integration of human rights norms in policy-making 
processes. The African Commission and African Court and national 
courts across the continent can gain valuable insights from the South 
African experience in experimenting with deliberative mechanisms at 
the review and remedial stages of human rights adjudication.
132 See in this regard Sachs J’s eloquent description of the unique dynamics of each 
eviction dispute in Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 41 above) para 31.
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